and Sklivas (1987) show how strategic delegation in the one-shot Cournot game reduces firm profits. However, with infinitely repeated interaction, strategic delegation allows for an improvement in cartel stability compared to the infinitely repeated standard Cournot game, thereby actually increasing profits.
Introduction
The strategic delegation literature shows how firms' profitability is reduced by delegating control to a manager being remunerated with a fraction of profit and sales 1 -see Fershtman and Judd (1987) and Sklivas (1987) (hereafter: FJS) 2 . This contribution extends FJS's seminal model to an infinitely repeated setting, thereby allowing firm owners as well as managers to collude. Strategic delegation then actually increases firms' profitability through improving cartel stability compared to the non-delegation Cournot game. 1 This result holds for FJS's most elaborate case of Cournot competition. 2 Ferstman and Judd (1987) and Sklivas (1987) simultaneously published their results with identical models. 3 Lambertini and Trombetta (2002) extend Vickers ' (1985) model -which can be rewritten in terms of FJS -and derive the opposite result by implicitly assuming that firm owners do not react rationally on a managerial defection. Han (2010a) comments on their analysis by considering rational owners.
The intuition is two-fold. First, a manager defecting from collusion can be fiercely punished by owners as they can stop delegating control. Second, this punishment strategy is more stable than collusion in the infinitely repeated standard Cournot game, because it is supported by the threat of reverting to FJS's unprofitable one-shot delegation equilibrium. Hence, FJS's key result of "unprofitable delegation" actually helps owners to credibly commit to a fierce punishment strategy, thereby increasing cartel stability and thus firm profits.
The repeated strategic delegation model
Consider FJS's delegation game. Two homogenous firms i = 1, 2 produce at unit cost c ≥ 0 and compete in quantities facing linear demand
where p is market price, q i is output of firm i, and Q = q 1 + q 2 is total output. Each firm i is owned by profit-maximising owner i (female) who may delegate control to manager i (male) by remunerating him with a fraction α i of profit π i plus a fraction 1 − α i of sales S i ,
which can be rewritten as M i = (p − α i c) q i . The manager earns nothing if the owner does not delegate control to him.The timing of the stage game is:
1. both owners simultaneously decide whether to delegate or to keep control, 2. if owner i delegates, she sets incentives α i (possibly) simultaneously with her rival, and 3. the players in control of the firms simultaneously set quantities on the product market.
Extending FJS, this stage game is infinitely repeated in each period t = 1...∞, thereby allowing for collusion on three dimensions: the delegation decision, incentives, and quantities. Owners and managers maximise their discounted stream of payoffs using discount factor δ o and δ m , respectively. To keep the analysis clean and to stay in line with the literature, collusion is on the monopoly quantity and punishment on the product market is characterised by reversion to the static Nash equilibrium forever. Everything is common knowledge and fully observable to all players. I focus on symmetric equilibria and denote i's rival by j.
Delegation improves the stability of collusion
Owners' and managers' behavior, respectively, is labelled by o, m ∈ {N, C, D}, denoting Nash (N ), collusion (C), and defection (D). I use those labels as superscripts for the decision and payoff variables. Collusion by owners and managers is stable if and only if
Benchmarks
Consider the following benchmarks, which are formally derived in Appendix A. In FJS's one-shot Cournot delegation game, owners are captured in a prisoner's dilemma and cannot avoid delegation, resulting in equilibrium incentives, quantities and payoffs
which entails a lower profit than if owners would have been able to escape delegation and play the standard Cournot game,
where superscript m for managerial behavior is omitted as managers do not participate. In the infinitely repeated standard Cournot model, collusion is stable if and only if δ o ≥ 9 17
Collusive equilibrium with delegation
In the infinitely repeated version of FJS's delegation game, the collusive delegation equilibrium yielding full monopoly profits entails owners delegating control by giving no incentives for sales, thereby "selling the store" to managers whose objective then is to maximise profit. Appendix B formally derives that and
, yielding
which is maximised at π
with α
. As defection profit equals collusive profit, while triggering future punishment, owners would never make such a defection.
If instead owner i defects by not delegating, this triggers Nash competition with her rival's manager j in stage 3. They respectively maximise
, which is lower than the collusive profit. Therefore, owners do not defect from the delegation decision. Lemma 1 summarises. . To optimally prevent such a managerial defection, owners will try to commit to avoid delegating control in future periods, thereby fiercely punishing the manager with a zero payoff. Owner's commitment to avoid delegation. Whether owners are indeed able to punish managers by avoiding delegation depends on the owners' patience δ o . Appendix C shows that the owners' commitment to not delegate suffers from FJS's prisoners dilemma when owners compete in quantities while keeping control, but it is no concern when owners collude on quantities while keeping control.
Lemma 1 Independent of the discount factor δ o , owners do not defect from collusion.
When owners punish a deviant manager by keeping control and colluding on quantities themselves, equilibrium profit during punishment is π . By constraint (1a), i.e. δ o ≥ .
The intuition is that managers face an extremely bad consequences from defection as owners will punish them by not delegating control in the future. Owners can commit to such punishment for a large set of discount factors, because an owner's defection from this punishment results in FJS's unprofitable one-shot delegation equilibrium.
Comparing profits in the infinitely repeated version of FJS's Cournot delegation model with those in the infinitely repeated standard Cournot model yields a lower equilibrium profit , and the same equilibrium profit . The following Proposition summarises.
Proposition 2 In an infinitely repeated setting, FJS's static key result that delegation reduces firms' profitability does not hold for high discount factors, is reversed for intermediate discount factors, and survives for low discount factors.

Concluding Remark
Whether delegation improves cartel stability and increases profits in more general frameworks is an ingoing debate. Following pioneering work by Spagnolo (2000 Spagnolo ( , 2005 , more recent contributions by Aubert (2009) and Angelucci and Han (2010) model this question in a principal-agent framework, thereby studying issues related to information asymmetries.
Appendix A
Outcome (3) is straightforwardly obtained as the static Nash equilibrium when both owners independently maximise π i = (p − c) q i , while outcome (4) is obtained when owners jointly maximise
, owner i's optimal defection quantity is
, leading to profit π
.
Collusion is thus stable if and only if
. Consider FJS's one-shot Cournot delegation game. In stage 3, both managers independently maximise M i = (p − α i c) q i , leading to quantities as a function of incentives
In stage 2, both owners substitute these into π i = (a − b (q i + q j ) − c) q i to independently maximise profit, yielding outcome (2), provided that both owners indeed delegate in stage 1. If both owners keep control, they each earn the Cournot Nash profit π
. If owner i delegates, while owner j keeps control, then quantities as a function of incentives α i become q i (α i , 1) and q j (1, α i ) by (6) . In stage 2, owner i then maximises
with profits
Since owner i is better off by delegating if her rival keeps control, while owner j is worse off if she keeps control and her rival delegates compared to when both owners delegate, owners indeed delegate in stage 1.
Appendix B
In stage 3, managers jointly maximise
. Focusing on symmetric equilibria, both managers set the same quantity as a function of incentives,
, which holds for symmetric incentives α 1 = α 2 = α, resulting in
. Substituting these in the owners' profit functions gives π i = . If she defects from the punishment scheme by delegating control, then in stage 3 manager i and owner j compete with respective
and profit
. Since defection triggers punishment by FJS's one-shot delegation Nash equilibrium with profit π , while defection from the punishment scheme by delegating control results in competition between manager i and owner j with defection profit π
-see equation (7) . Since defection profit equals collusive profit, owners will not defect from punishment through delegation.
Appendix D
This Appendix shows that not delegating control is indeed the best strategy for owners to punish a deviant manager. First, suppose owners instead punish by reverting to 'delegation and compete in setting incentives'. We then get FJS's static outcome (2) , thereby making collusion fully unstable in the first place. Second, suppose owners punish by reverting to 'delegation and collude in setting incentives'. In stage 3, managers set quantities as outlined in (6) . In stage 2, owners substitute these into their joint profit function . If owner i deviates by setting different incentives, straightforward algebra leads to the optimal deviating incentive being α .
